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Introduction	  
	   This	   paper	   aims	   to	   further	   investigate	   hybrid	   regimes,	   which	   are	  becoming	   a	  more	   and	  more	   analysed	   topic	   in	   political	   studies.	   After	   the	   path-­‐breaking	   article	   by	   Thomas	   Carothers	   (Carothers,	   2002)	  where	   he	   claims	   that	  many	  of	   the	  regimes	   that	  were	  considered	  usually	   in	  “transition”	  were	  actually	  proved	   highly	   durable	   and	   did	   not	   move	   neither	   toward	   autocracy	   nor	  democracy,	   other	   scholars	   started	   to	   be	   interested	   in	   this	   particular	  phenomenon	  as	  such.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  stem	  from	  the	  definition	  of	  Hybrid	  regimes	  provided	  by	  Leonardo	  Morlino:	   “A	  hybrid	   regime	   is	   always	  a	   set	  of	   ambiguous	  institutions	   […]	   lacking	   as	   it	   does	   one	   or	  more	   essential	   characteristics	   of	   that	  regime	  but	  also	   failing	  to	  acquire	  other	  characteristics	   that	  would	  make	   it	   fully	  democratic	   or	   authoritarian”	   (Morlino,	   2008:7),	   in	   order	   to	   investigate	   how	  incumbents	  hold	  and	  strengthen	  power	  in	  this	  peculiar	  political	  and	  institutional	  environment,	   without	   forcefully	   become	   never	   fully	   authoritarian	   or	   fully	  democratic.	  	  	  In	   this	   paper,	   Georgia	   is	   taken	   as	   case	   study	  because	   first	   of	   all	   Georgia	  was	   a	  durable	   hybrid	   regime	   for	   at	   least	   two	   decades:	   despite	   two	   revolutions	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(independence	   and	  Rose	  Revolution)	  Georgia	   never	   reached	   the	   rank	  of	   stable	  democracy	  in	  any	  of	  the	  indicators	  (Policy	  IV,	  Economist	  Intelligent	  Unit	  “Index	  of	   Democracy”,	   Freedom	   House)1 .	   Secondly,	   because	   Georgia	   provides	   two	  different	   examples	   of	   incumbent’s	   ruling	   style	   in	   the	   context	   of	   hybrid	   regime.	  Indeed,	  the	   lack	  of	   full	  democratization	  allows	  me	  to	  take	  this	  case	  as	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  a	  hybrid	  regime	  with	  two	  starkly	  different	  periods,	  which	  consist	  of	  disparate	   sets	   of	   political	   choices.	   	   Thirdly	   because	   Georgia’s	   recent	   history	   is	  characterized	  by	   the	  presence	  of	   strong	  actors	   that	  affected	   the	  capacity	  of	   the	  incumbents	  to	  rule	  the	  country.	  	  As	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  I	  am	  going	  to	  use	  the	  Theory	  of	  Domestic	  Anchoring	  (Morlino	  1998,	   2011),	  which	   allow	  me	   to	   explain	   the	   top-­‐down	  processes	   that	  link	   incumbent	   elite	   with	   other	   stakeholders	   and	   groups	   in	   the	   society.	   In	  particular	   this	   study	   shows	   how	   and	   through	   what	   means	   rulers	   in	   Georgia	  consolidated	   hybridity	   instead	   of	   democracy	   or	   autocracy.	   Thanks	   to	   the	  adoption	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “anchor”	  I	  am	  able	  to	  analyse	  how	  both	  Shevardnadze	  and	   Saakashvili	   used	   this	   tenet	   in	   order	   to	   consolidate	   their	   power	   vis	   à	   vis	  possible	  opposition	  groups	  in	  a	  durable	  hybrid	  regime,	  and	  to	  prove	  that	  even	  in	  hybrid	  regimes	  there	  are	  anchoring	  mechanisms	  that	  characterize	  the	  strength,	  the	  grip	  on	  the	  society	  and	  the	  ruling	  style	  of	   the	   incumbent.	  This	   is	   important	  insofar	  it	  provide	  further	  investigation	  on	  hybrid	  regime,	  which	  are	  yet	  far	  from	  being	   deeply	   explored	   as	   regime	   as	   such.	   In	   order	   to	   evaluate	   the	   “anchoring”	  capacity	  of	  both	  the	  presidencies	  I	  will	  look	  at	  three	  main	  issues,	  fundamental	  to	  consolidate	  the	  regime,	  which	  involved	  the	  elites	   in	  post-­‐independence	  Georgia	  and	   that	   characterized	   the	   last	   two	   decades	   of	   recent	   Georgian’s	   history:	  warlords	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  territory,	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  political	  actors,	  and	  relationship	  between	  political	  and	  economic	  elites.	  	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  I	  am	  going	  to	  provide	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  in	  terms	  of	  literature	  concerning	  hybrid	  regimes,	  underling	  how	  there	  is	  still	  much	  to	  analyse	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  comprehension	  of	  this	  particular	  form	   of	   regime.	   In	   the	   second	   part	   I	   am	   going	   to	   present	   the	   theory	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  addiction	  Georgia	  has	  been	  classified	  as	  a	  stable	  hybrid	  regime	  for	  the	  period	  from	  1991-­‐2006	  by	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domestic	  anchoring	  and	  I	  explain	  how	  it	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  help	  in	  understanding	  hybrid	   regimes’	   power	   dynamics.	   In	   the	   third	   part	   I	   analyse	   the	   two	   different	  presidencies	   in	   Georgia	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   they	   acted	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   three	  linchpins	  (warlords	  and	  territorial	  integrity,	  fragmentation	  of	  political	  actors	  and	  political-­‐economic	   relationships)	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   continuation	   of	   informal	   and	  institutional	   manipulations.	   Finally,	   I	   provide	   an	   additional	   understanding	   of	  these	   processes:	   on	   one	   hand	   I	   show	   how	   even	   in	   hybrid	   regime	   there	   is	   a	  consolidation	  process	  that	  allow	  the	  regime	  to	  be	  durable;	  secondly,	   I	   interpret	  those	   finding	   with	   the	   theory	   of	   anchoring,	   demonstrating	   how	   democratic	  theories	  might	  be	  helpful	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  non-­‐democratic	  processes.	  	  	  
Literature	  review	  on	  hybrid	  regimes	  	  In	  the	  last	  decades	  there	  has	  been	  a	  growing	  attention	  on	  different	  regimes	  types	  that	  followed	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  democratization.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  facts,	  many	  third	  waves	   countries	   could	   not	   be	   straightforward	   labelled	   as	   democratic	   or	  autocratic,	   and	   subsequently	   this	   triggered	   a	   long-­‐standing	   debate	   about	   this	  “grey	  zone”	  and	  on	  the	  definitions	  of	  democracy.	  This	  debate	  has	  not	  yet	  comes	  to	   an	   epilogue,	   and	   despite	   the	   already	  mentioned	   end	   of	   the	   “transitiologist”	  paradigm	   (Carothers,	   2002)	   there	   is	   still	   a	   lively	   debate	   on	   labelling	   the	  disparate	   variety	   of	   regimes	   around	   the	   world	   according	   to	   the	   degree	   of	  “democratic/autocratic”	  outlook.	  In	  particular,	  for	  what	  concern	  hybrid	  regimes,	  Epstein	  asserted	   that	  partial	  democracies	   “account	   for	  an	   increasing	  portion	  of	  current	   regimes	   and	   the	   lion’s	   share	   of	   regime	   transitions”	   (Epstein	   et	   all.,	  2006:564).	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  facts	  Henry	  E.	  Hale	  claims,	  “The	  chief	  goal	  of	  research	  has	   been	   less	   to	   understand	   how	   these	   regimes	   actually	   function	   and	  more	   to	  evaluate	   their	   prospects	   for	   becoming	   more	   democratic”	   (Hale,	   2011:23).	   In	  addiction,	  Hale	  argues	  that	  hybrid	  regimes	  must	  be	  studied	  on	  their	  own	  because	  they	  posses	  some	  characteristics	  that	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  peculiars.	  This	   is	  a	  new	  conceptualization	  of	  hybridity,	  which	  consider	   it	   as	  a	  distinct	  and	  durable	  regime	   type	   and	   it	   is	   becoming	   prominent	   in	   the	   literature	   (see	   for	   example	  Larry	   Diamond,	   2002;	   Leonardo	   Morlino,	   2008;	   Steven	   Levitsky	   and	   Luncan	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Way,	   2010;	   Andreas	   Schedler,	   2013).	   However,	   what	   is	   still	   missing	   is	   a	   deep	  understanding	  of	  how	  this	  kind	  of	  regimes	  function.	  	  	  Some	   attempts	   to	   explain	   how	   incumbents	   rule	   in	   hybrid	   regimes	   have	   been	  carried	   out,	   such	   as	   the	   careful	   analysis	   of	   Andreas	   Schedler	   (2013)	   about	   the	  key	  characteristics	  that	  affect	  electoral	  autocracies,	  which	  are	  informational	  and	  institutional	  uncertainties,	  especially	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  deal	  with	  elections.	  The	  latters	   are	   considered	   as	   arenas	   of	   asymmetric	   conflicts	   in	   which	   internal	  dynamics	   unfold	   within	   theirs	   confines	   (Schedler,	   2013:	   7);	   according	   to	  Schedler’s	   analysis,	   incumbents	   in	   electoral	   autocracies	   cannot	   avoid	   the	  opposition	  to	  strive	  for	  winning	  the	  election	  and	  being	  elected,	  but	  they	  dispose	  a	   variety	   of	   tools	   (such	   as	   institutional	   manipulation)	   in	   order	   to	   nullify	  opposition’s	  attempts	  to	  get	  the	  power.	  Schedler’s	  analysis	  is	  extremely	  inspiring	  and	  it	  helps	  scholars	  to	  focus	  on	  further	  investigating	  the	  unsecure	  environment	  in	  which	  incumbents	  operate	  in	  hybrid	  regimes.	  Rulers	  might	  use	  an	  infinite	  way	  and	   infinite	   elements	   that	   can	   enhance	   the	   longevity	   of	   their	   regime.	   In	   the	  already	   mentioned	   analysis	   by	   Hale	   (2011),	   he	   categorizes	   and	   lists	   several	  methods,	   which	   are	   at	   the	   incumbents’	   disposal	   in	   order	   to	   defeat	   their	  opponents,	   this	   includes	   media	   manipulation,	   coercing	   or	   buying	   votes,	  supporting	  informal	  groups	  to	  attack	  opposition,	  manipulation	  of	  the	  choice	  set	  (creating	   fake	   opposition	   movement	   as	   a	   way	   of	   challenging	   or	   diverting	  opposition	   votes),	   selective	   prosecution,	   falsification	   (stolen	   elections)	  pressuring,	  co-­‐opting	  or	  blackmailing	  elites.	  	  In	   this	   study	   I	   focus	  mainly	  on	   the	   last	   example	  of	  method,	  because	  as	   long	  as	  recent	   analyses	   of	   “Coloured	   Revolutions”	   are	   concerned,	   elites	   defections	   are	  identified	  as	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  change	  of	  regime	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Georgia’s	  Rose	  Revolution	  (Radnitz,	  2010;	  Hale,	  2006;	  McFaul,	  2005;	  Paul	  D’Anieri,	  2006;	  Welt,	   2010;	  Wheatley	   2010).	   Therefore,	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   elitist	   theory	   I	  consider	  “elites	  management”	  one	  of	   the	  key	  characteristics	   for	  consolidating	  a	  long-­‐lasting	  hybrid	   regime.	  As	  David	  Truman	  writes	   the	   stability	  of	   the	   system	  depends	  upon	  the	  elites,	  “being	  more	  influential,	  they	  are	  privileged;	  and,	  being	  privileged,	   they	  have,	  with	   few	  exception,	  a	  special	  stake	   in	   the	  continuation	  of	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the	  political	  system	  on	  which	  their	  privileges	  rest”	  (Truman,	  1959:	  489).	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  further	  investigate	  the	  role	  and	  the	  dynamics	  performed	  by	  these	  actors	  I	  borrow	  a	  theory	  from	  democratization	  studies,	  the	  Theory	  of	  Anchoring,	  which	  explains	  how	  domestic	  incumbent	  elite	  managed	  to	  keep	  bound	  different	  societal	  actors	  and	  other	  elites	  to	  their	  regime.	  	  	  
A	  democratic	  theory	  for	  a	  non-­‐democratic	  process	  
	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  use	  a	  theory	  coming	  from	  democratization	  studies,	  first	  of	  all	   I	   should	   investigate	   if	   there	  are	   the	  pre-­‐conditions	   that	  allow	  me	   to	  borrow	  safely	   concepts	   and	   theoretical	   frameworks	   from	   one	   field	   to	   another.	   The	  Theory	   of	   Anchoring	   has	   been	   conceived	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	   consolidation	  process	  as	  whole,	  because	  at	   the	   time	  being	   the	  mainstream	   literature	  was	   too	  much	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  of	   legitimization	  and	  legitimacy	  (Morlino	  2011:	  109).	  As	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	   for	  many	   authors	   legitimacy	  was	   the	  most	   important	   and	  even	   defining	   element	   for	   democratic	   consolidation	   (Linz	   and	   Stepan,	   1996;	  Diamond,	  1999).	  However,	   in	   the	   course	  of	   time,	   democratic	   consolidation	  has	  come	   to	   include	   a	   variety	   of	   items	   such	   as	   the	   neutralization	   of	   anti-­‐system	  actors,	   civilian	   supremacy	   over	   the	   military,	   the	   elimination	   of	   authoritarian	  enclaves,	  party	  building,	  the	  organization	  of	  functional	  interests,	  the	  stabilization	  of	   electoral	   rules,	   the	   “routinization”	   of	   politics,	   the	   decentralization	   of	   state	  power,	   judicial	   reform,	   the	   alleviation	   of	   poverty,	   and	   economic	   stabilization	  (Schedler,	   1998:92);	   therefore,	   consolidation	   encompasses	   much	   more	   than	  legitimacy,	  and	   it	  goes	  beyond	  mere	   legitimizing	  stances.	  According	  to	  Philippe	  Schmitter	   “regime	   consolidation	   consists	   of	   transforming	   the	   accidental	  arrangements,	   prudential	   norms	   and	   contingent	   solutions	   that	   emerged	   […]	  during	   the	   uncertain	   struggles	   of	   the	   transition	   into	   structures,	   i.e.	   into	  relationships	   that	   are	   reliably	   known,	   regularly	   practiced	   and	   habitually	  accepted	   by	   those	   persons	   or	   collectives	   defined	   as	  participants/citizens/subjects	   of	   such	   structures”	   (Schmitter,	   1995:	   539).	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  integrate	  the	  different	  nuances	  of	  consolidation	  in	  a	   consistent	   theoretical	   framework.	   In	   the	   Theory	   of	   Anchoring	   we	   find	   the	  process	  of	  democratic	   consolidation	   composed	  by	   two	  different	   sub-­‐processes;	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on	  one	  hand	  there	  is	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  process,	  “legitimation”,	  which	  is	  conceived	  as	  “positive	   societal	   attitudes	   […]	   that,	   in	   spite	   of	   shortcomings	   and	   failures,	  existing	   political	   institutions	   are	   better	   than	   possible	   alternatives”	   (Morlino,	  2011:	   112);	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   there	   is	   the	   top-­‐down	   process,	   which	   is	   the	  “anchor”.	   An	   anchor	   is	   “an	   institution,	   entailing	   organizational	   elements	   and	  vested	  interest,	  that	  is	  able	  to	  perform	  a	  hooking	  and	  binding	  effect	  on	  more	  or	  less	   organized	   people	  within	   a	   society”	   (Morlino,	   2011:113).	   This	   process,	   the	  creation	   of	   anchors,	   is	   performed	   by	   the	   elites	   at	   the	   time	   of	   transition	   and	  instauration	  of	  a	  new	  regime.	  	  	  At	   this	   point,	   two	   simples	  but	   straightforward	  questions	  would	   rise:	   is	   there	   a	  consolidation	   period	   even	   in	   hybrid	   regimes?	   How	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   a	   hybrid	  regime	   stabilize?	   According	   to	   some	   scholars	   there	   are	   periods	   in	   which	  incumbents	  must	  overcome	  challenges	   to	   their	  rules	  and	   to	  manage	   the	  vested	  interests	   that	   would	   underpin	   their	   governments.	   The	   anchoring	   side	   of	   a	  consolidation	   process	   is	   emphasised	   by	   Christian	   who	   writes	   that	   democratic	  and	   authoritarian	   regimes	   face	   similar	   challenges	   such	   as	   “establishing	   and	  upholding	   universal	   rules	   of	   the	   game	   to	   prevent	   splits	   in	   leadership,	   secure	  society’s	   compliance	   and	   gain	   support	   if	   the	   regime	   is	   to	   become	   sustainable”	  (Gobel,	   2011:	   177).	   This	   conception	   is	   shared	   by	   those	   scholars	  who	   consider	  autocracies	   not	   necessarily	   instable	   or	   less	   viable	   than	   democracies	   (Schedler,	  2006;	  Brooker,	  2009).	  The	  already	  mentioned	  analysis	  by	  Hale,	  underlines	  how	  hybrid	   regimes	   showed	   un-­‐expected	   longevity	   and	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	  regime	   institutionalization	   in	   attaining	   stability	   and	   durability	   performances	  (Hale,	  2011:40).	  Furthermore,	  democratic	   institutions,	  such	  as	  parliaments	  and	  political	  parties	  are	  fundamental	  sources	  of	  stability	  for	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  because,	   by	   establishing	   formally	   representative	   institutions,	   authoritarian	  rulers	  set	  up	  relations	  of	  dependency	  (Schedler	  2013:	  72;	  Gandhi,	  2008).	  Yet,	  the	  consolidation	  of	  an	  hybrid	  regimes	  is	  not	  composed	  only	  by	  top-­‐down	  processes,	  even	  the	  second	  sub-­‐process	  of	  consolidation,	  bottom-­‐up,	   is	  observed	  in	  hybrid	  regime:	   corroboration	   for	   this	   claim	   come	   from	   recent	   studies,	   which	  demonstrate	  how	  even	  non-­‐democratic	  regimes	  necessitate	  forms	  of	   legitimacy	  that	  are	  fundamental	  in	  consolidating	  their	  stability	  (Gilley,	  2006;	  Schlumberger,	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2004,	  2007);	   in	  addiction,	   there	  are	  other	  researches	  highlighting	   that	  political	  skills,	   such	   as	   political	   communication	   and	   marketing	   are	   as	   important	   in	  democracy	  as	  in	  autocracy	  (Way,	  2005).	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  observe	  straightforwardly	  that	  Shevardnadze	  or	  Saakashvili	  aimed	  to	  establish	  or	  consolidate	  a	  hybrid	  regime	  per	  se.	  Hybridity	  is	  a	  result	  of	  certain	   practices	   and	   procedures	   that	   characterize	   a	   form	   of	   managing	   the	  country,	   or	   the	   outcomes	   of	   a	   negligence	   to	   implement	   other	   policies.	   Nobody	  would	  profess	  to	  undertake	  some	  reforms	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  hybrid	  regime	  or	  to	  manipulate	  some	  democratic	  institutions.	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  democratic	  state	  with	  a	  proper	  rule	  of	   law	  was	  the	  slogan	  in	  most	  of	  the	  newly	  independent	   states,	   because,	   as	   Mazmanyan	   asserts,	   in	   post-­‐Communist	  countries	   “democracy	   remains	   the	   legitimising	   ideology”	   (Mazmanyan,	  2010:196),	  even	  if	  eventually	  it	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  real	  democratization	  process.	  In	  addiction,	   the	   apparent	   rejection	   of	   authoritarianism	   was	   “a	   strategy	   for	  authoritarian	   leaders	   seeking	   to	   protect	   themselves	   from	   the	   power	   of	   other	  bureaucrats”	   (Roeder,	   2001:33).	   Therefore,	   according	   to	   Roeder,	   in	   Georgia	  there	  was	   an	   inconsistent	   inclusion	   of	   the	   selectorate2,	  which	   determined	   that	  “[in	   Georgia]	   it	   is	   consensus	   among	   power	   holder	   rather	   than	   open	   public	  contestation	  that	  selects	  their	   leader[s]”	  (Roeder,	  2001:16).	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  anchoring	   mechanism	   is	   far	   more	   important	   for	   hybrid	   regimes	   insofar	   it	  counterbalances	  the	  low	  level	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  regime.	  As	  Morlino	  asserts,	  “to	  achieve	  consolidation,	  the	  more	  exclusive	  the	  legitimacy,	  the	  stronger	  and	  more	  developed	  the	  anchors	  have	  to	  be.”	  (Morlino	  2011:113).	  In	  this	  study	  I	  consider	  the	   stabilisation	   of	   elites	   as	   indicator	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   strong	   anchors	   that	  hooked	  and	  bound	  the	  incumbents	  to	  the	  other	  societal	  actors.	  	  One	  may	  argue	   that	   the	  concept	  of	   “linkage”	  (see	   for	  example	  Lawson	  1988)	   is	  extremely	   close	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   anchor.	   Yet,	   I	   found	   the	   latter	   theoretical	  framework	   more	   adaptable	   to	   hybrid	   regimes	   contexts	   because	   firstly	   it	  encompasses	  two	  mechanisms	  of	  hooking	  and	  binding	  with	  some	  outcomes	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  According	  to	  Roeder,	  the	  selectorate	  is	  “the	  group	  that	  can	  pose	  a	  credible	  threat	  of	  removing	  the	  policy	  makers;	  it	  can	  be	  formed	  by	  people	  inside	  the	  state	  apparatus	  or	  a	  selectorate	  in	  the	  society	  (Roeder,	  2001:14)	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as	   stabilisation	   and	   consolidation;	   secondly	   it	   suggests	   to	   asymmetrical	  connections	   between	   institutions	   and	   social	   groups	   or	   individuals	   (Morlino,	  2011:114).	  This	  asymmetry,	  which	  characterizes	   the	  anchoring	  process,	   is	  well	  observable	   in	  one	  of	   the	   strongest	   type	  of	   anchors:	   clientelism.	  As	  we	  will	   see,	  these	  relationships	  were	  overwhelming	  in	  the	  Georgian	  case.	  	  To	   conclude,	   as	   this	   paragraph	   demonstrated	   there	   is	   a	   new	   stream	   in	   the	  literature	   that	   consider	   consolidation	   as	   a	   process	   that	   affects	   both	   non-­‐democratic	   and	   democratic	   regime.	   In	   this	   study,	   through	   the	   theory	   of	  democratic	   anchoring,	   which	   is	   conceived	   to	   explain	   a	   sub-­‐process	   of	   the	  democratic	  consolidation	  and	  can	  be	  –	  mutatis	  mutandis	  –	  adopted	  to	  study	  the	  domestic	  process	  of	  hybrid	  consolidation,	  I	  provide	  evidences	  to	  this	  theoretical	  assumption,	   through	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   regime	   consolidation	   by	   Edward	  Shevardnaze	  and	  Mikail	  Saakashvili.	  	  
The	  First	  Consolidation:	  Shevardnadze’s	  Presidency	  
	  The	  case	  of	  Georgia	  independence	  was	  one	  of	  the	  bloodiest	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  (hereafter	  FSU)	  countries.	  In	  occasion	  of	  the	  Congress	  of	  People’s	  election,	  which	  resulted	  highly	  controlled	  by	  communist	  party	  officials	  (Slider,	  1997:	  160)	  opposition	  movement	  peacefully	  manifested	  discontent;	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  April	  1989	   soviet	   troops	   repressed	   violently	   the	   sit-­‐in	   in	   front	   of	   the	   government	  building.	  The	  political	  environment	  in	  Georgia	  became	  extremely	  radicalized	  and	  highly	  anti-­‐Soviet,	  with	  a	   renewed	  chauvinistic	   fervour.	  Gamsakhurdia	  was	   the	  best	   figure	   in	   order	   to	   drive	   the	   country	   out	   of	   the	   Soviet	   sphere;	   he	   was	   an	  intellectual	  who	   struggled	   against	   Sovietization	   of	  Georgia	   and	   a	   human	   rights	  activists.	  However,	  from	  early	  1990	  Georgia	  witnessed	  an	  escalation	  of	  violence	  among	   political,	   societal	   and	   ethnical	   actors.	   In	   particular,	   criminal	   group	  (warlords)	   formed	   during	   the	   Soviet	   period	   played	   a	   major	   role	   triggering	  violence	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   vested	   interests	   and	   privileged	   positions	   in	   the	  country’s	   political	   establishment.	   Moreover,	   the	   nationalist	   outlook	   of	  Gamsakhurdia’s	  government	  exacerbates	  ethnic	  tensions	  and	  separatists’	  claims	  in	  Abkhazia,	  Ajara	  and	  South	  Ossetia.	  Gasmakhurdia	  did	  not	  succeed	  dealing	  with	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domestic	  order	  and	  rooting	  out	  the	  warlords;	  he	  lacked	  the	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	   political	   compromises	   and	   had	   and	   extremely	   polarized	   style	   of	   leadership	  which	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  his	  failure	  (Jawada,	  2012:	  144),	  moreover	  some	  provision	   aimed	   to	   this	   goal	   proved	   to	   be	   counterproductive	   (such	   as	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   National	   Guard,	   which	   became	   in	   turn	   another	   element	   of	  secure	   instability).	   The	   military	   coup	   took	   place	   on	   January	   6	   1990;	  Gamsakhurdia	   had	   to	   leave	   from	   the	   country,	   and	   armed	   groups	   seized	   the	  power.	   For	   the	   time	   being	   Jaba	   Ioselani	   and	   Tengiz	   Kitovani	   were	   the	   two	  strongest	   men	   in	   the	   country;	   they	   headed	   the	   two	   most	   important	   quasi-­‐military	   organizations	   (respectively	   Mkhedrioni	   and	   National	   Guard)	   but	   they	  were	  rivals.	  Yet,	  they	  agreed	  on	  invite	  the	  former	  first	  secretary	  of	  the	  Georgian	  Communist	  Party	  Edward	  Shevardnadze	  back	  in	  Georgia	  to	  lead	  the	  new	  state.	  	  	  When	  Shevardnadze	  returned	  to	  Georgia	  in	  1992,	  he	  found	  a	  state	  that	  was	  yet	  to	  be	  consolidated.	  At	  his	  arrival	  Shevardnadze	  was	  appointed	  as	  speaker	  of	  the	  parliament,	   which	   acted	   as	   President	   of	   the	   country.	   The	   institution	   and	   the	  provisions	   of	   the	   young	   Georgian	   state	   were	   close	   to	   collapse	   (Jawada,	  2012:144).	   Shevardnadze	   had	   to	   consolidate	   both	   his	   leadership	   and	   state	  institution	   avoiding	   the	   re-­‐kindle	   of	   the	   civil	  war	   and	   the	   separatist	   stances	   of	  some	  regions.	  	  	  After	  the	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  troubled	  independence	  from	  the	  FSU,	  it	  could	  be	  asked	  how	  Shevardnadze	  assured	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  the	  elites	  and	  consolidated	  the	   hybrid	   regime	   in	   Georgia.	   The	   first	   issue	   was	   first	   of	   all	   related	   to	   the	  challenging	  presence	  of	  armed	  groups	  around	  the	  country,	  which	  were	  loyal	  just	  to	  warlords.	  	  In	  Georgia	  the	  warlords	  and	  their	  militias	  acted	  as	  un-­‐official	  army	  because	  the	  inexistence	   of	   an	   official	   body	   intended	   to	   provide	   with	   security.	   A	   Georgian	  academic	  said,	  “We	  have	  passed	  through	  the	  romantic	  stage	  and	  now	  we	  are	  in	  what	  I	  call	  the	  ‘Afghanistan	  period’	  of	  Georgia”	  (Remnick,	  1990).	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  Shevardnadze	  government,	  the	  leader	  of	  Mkhedrioni,	  Ioselani,	  and	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  National	  Guard	  Kitovani	  kept	  in	  check	  Shevardnadze	  who	  could	  not	  root	  out	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their	   influences.	   Consequently	   the	   two	   warlords	   were	   benefiting	   from	   their	  position	  of	  power:	  Ioselani	  was	  elected	  in	  the	  Georgian	  Parliament	  and	  obtained	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior,	  whereas	  Kitovani	  continued	  to	  act	  as	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  and	  remained	  at	  the	  command	  of	  the	  National	  Guard.	  Thanks	  to	  this	  agreement	  Shevardnadze	  could	  try	  to	  demobilize	  part	  of	  the	  militias,	  even	  if	   contrasts	   rose	   concerning	   the	   role	   and	   the	   tasks	   that	   they	   had	   to	   carry	   out	  (Weathley,	  2005:68).	  The	  problem	  of	  the	  warlords	  is	  deeply	  entrenched	  with	  the	  quest	   for	  separatism	   in	  some	  ethnic	   regions	  of	  Georgia.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   facts,	  at	  least	   two	   other	   warlords	   coming	   from	   the	   “periphery”	   of	   the	   country	   were	  challenging,	   even	   more	   directly,	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   state	   and	   thus,	   its	  sovereignty;	   they	   were	   Aslan	   Abashidze	   in	   the	   province	   of	   Ajara	   and	   Emzar	  Kvitsiani	  in	  the	  district	  of	  Upper	  Kodori.	  Both	  the	  warlords	  acted	  as	  middleman	  between	  Tbilisi	  and	  local	  population,	  they	  were	  collecting	  revenues	  and	  customs	  duty	  in	  the	  respective	  zones	  and	  they	  were	  at	  the	  top	  of	  a	  patronage	  pyramid.	  In	  order	   to	   tackle	   a	   possible	   secessionists	   action,	   Shevardnadze	   opted	   to	  accommodate	  with	  both	  the	  warlords	  (Marten,	  2012),	  reaching	  for	  an	  apparent	  stability	  at	  the	  cost	  accepting	  limits	  to	  Tbilisi	  direct	  control	  over	  those	  regions.	  In	  Ajara,	  Shevardnadze	  allowed	  Abashidze	  to	  act	  as	  middleman	  and	  to	  collect	  fees	  from	   the	   “border”.	   This	   accommodation	   served	   to	   Shevardnadze	   as	   well,	   who	  could	  establish	  a	  personal	  patronage	  relationship	  with	  Abashidze.	  For	  example	  in	   the	   contested	   election	   of	   2003	   Shevardnadze	   could	   relied	   on	   Abashidze’s	  unique	  party	  (Revival	  Party)	  for	  a	  strategic	  alliance,	  which	  allowed	  him	  to	  claim	  for	  victory.	  In	  the	  Upper	  Kodori,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Abkhaz-­‐Georgian3	  war	  and	  the	   subsequent	   case-­‐fire	   in	   1993,	   Shevardnadze	   promoted	   a	   carrot	   policy	  appointing	   Kvitsiani	   as	   first	   deputy	   representative.	   In	   addiction	   Kvitsiani	  reported	   to	   have	   been	   paid	   by	   Shevardnadze	   $	   50.000	   per	   month	   for	   his	  cooperation	   in	   “humanitarian	   aid”	   (Marten,	   2012:89).	   For	   the	   time	   being	  Shevardnadze	  could	  not	  coercively	  root	  out	  all	  the	  militias	  that	  were	  scampering	  around	   the	   country.	   Through	   the	   use	   of	   the	   negotiation	   and	   accommodation	  Shevardnadze	  succeeded	  to	  keep	  the	  country’s	  unity	  and	  to	  avoid	  the	  revival	  of	  the	   civil	   war.	   However,	   the	   agreements	   with	   the	   elites	   remained	   extremely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In	  August	  1993	  Kitovani	  organized	  a	  military	  attack	  in	  Abkhazia	  in	  order	  to	  eliminate	  all	  pro-­‐Gamsakhurdia	  militias.	  However,	  Georgian’s	  troops	  were	  ward-­‐off	  thanks	  to	  the	  Russian	  support	  to	  Abkhaz	  militias.	  The	  Kodori	  gorge	  became	  a	  buffer	  zone	  between	  Abhkazia	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Georgia.	  
	   11	  
unstable	   and	   the	   separatists’	   stances	   from	   several	   regions	   in	   Georgia	   never	  extinguished.	  	  Political	   fragmentation	  characterized	  especially	   the	   first	  years	  of	  Shevardnadze	  presidency.	   In	   part	   because	   of	   the	   electoral	   law	   that	   ruled	   the	   parliamentary	  election	  of	  1992	  (no	  minimum	  threshold,	  proportional	  system,	  and	  no	  possibility	  for	   the	   Central	   Electoral	   Commission	   to	   refuse	   the	   registration	   of	   political	  parties),	  in	  part	  because	  the	  lack	  of	  strong	  and	  dominant	  parties,	  in	  Georgia	  there	  was	  a	  highly	  fragmented	  political	  environment	  (there	  were	  24	  political	  parties	  in	  the	   parliament,	  which	   it	   has	   150	   seats	   overall).	   However,	   Shevardnadze	   could	  rely	   on,	   both	   in	   the	   capital	   and	   in	   the	   other	   regions,	   his	   personal	   political	  network	   from	   the	   period	  when	   he	  was	   First	   Secretary	   of	   Communist	   Party	   in	  Georgia	   (Weathley,	   2010:359).	   What	   characterized	   Shevardnadze	   ruling	   style	  was	   the	  widespread	  web	   of	   patron-­‐client	   relationship	   that	   became	   the	   central	  power	  of	  his	  presidency.	  According	  to	  Timm	  “Shevardnadze	  has	  made	  extensive	  use	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  integration	  not	  solely	  to	  secure	  his	  own	  political	  power	  base	  but	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   supporting	   a	   comprehensive	   state	   building	   process”	  (Timm,	   2012:170).	   These	   informal	   practices	   went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   formal	  structures	   in	   a	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   logic.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   according	   to	   this	  mechanism	  “clientelism	  combined	  with	  formal	  state	  structures	  can	  be	  identified	  as	   the	  engine	  of	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  authority”	   (Timm,	  2012:	  173).	  Administrative	  and	  political	  positions	  as	  well	  as	  public	  goods	  were	   the	  wares	  of	   the	  clientelist	  relationship;	   in	   this	  way	  clientelism	  acted	  as	   integrative	  capacity	   inasmuch	   the	  patron	  was	   performing	   a	   broker	   role	   for	   different	   social	   groups	   (Lemarchand,	  1972:66-­‐68).	   Thanks	   to	   these	   connections	   Shevardnadze	   could	   launch	  his	   new	  party	  Georgian	  Citizens’	  Union	  (CUG),	  which	  gravitated	  around	  his	  leadership.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  facts	  Shevardnadze	  was	  “the	  ultimate	  decision	  maker	  both	  within	  the	  State	  and	  within	  the	  CUG	  (Jawad,	  2012:145).	  The	  party	  allowed	  him	  to	  maintain	  lively	   connections;	   it	  was	   a	   “broad	   church	   that	   out	   of	   necessity	  would	   include	  most	   of	   the	   key	   players	   in	  Georgia”	   (Weathley,	   2010:359).	   Thanks	   to	   the	   CUG,	  Shevardnadze	  could	  have	  the	  new	  Constitution	  (which	  re-­‐introduced	  the	  post	  of	  president)	  adopted	  in	  August	  1995.	  This	  result	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  astonishing	  if	  we	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  high	  level	  of	  elites	  and	  political	  fragmentation;	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yet,	  it	  has	  been	  analysed	  as	  a	  symbolic	  seal	  among	  the	  elites	  (Roeder,	  2001)	  that	  signified	  a	  first	  step	  in	  the	  consolidation	  of	  power;	  however,	  as	  Merkel	  stressed	  “the	   introduction	   of	   democratic	   structures	   does	   not	   necessarily	   imply	   their	  institutionalisation”	  (Merkel,	  2012:51).	  	  	  In	   November	   1995	   there	   were	   both	   the	   Presidential	   and	   the	   Parliamentary	  elections	   that	  were	  won	   by	   Shevardnadze	   and	   the	   CUG	   respectively	  with	   75%	  and	  24%	  (which	  assured	  CUG	  to	  gain	  111/181	  seats)4.	  	  After	  1995	  Shevardnadze	  was	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   this	   system;	   he	   managed	   different	   vested	   interests	   in	  order	   to	   balance	   fragmented,	   competing	   and	   sometimes	   rival	   elites.	   Therefore,	  despite	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  assert	  that	  the	  organizational	  power	  by	  Shevardnadze	  was	   not	   so	   strong,	   and	   that	   he	   lacked	   coercive	   capacity	   (Levitsky	   and	   Way,	  2010:221)	  I	  would	  claim	  that	  after	  the	  Constitutional	  agreement	  and	  the	  election	  in	   November	   1995,	   Shevardnadze	   assured	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   country	  thanks	  to	  a	  widespread	  use	  of	  anchors.	  Thanks	  to	  these	  further	  anchors,	  he	  was	  finally	  able	  to	  get	  rid	  off	  his	  relations	  of	  dependency	  with	  Ioselani	  and	  Kivotani,	  whom	  still	  maintained	  renowned	  positions	  in	  his	  entourage5.	  	  	  The	  ample	  use	  of	  co-­‐option	  went	  far	  beyond	  the	  solely	  political	  sphere	  but	  was	  aimed	  to	  entangle	  all	  the	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  country.	  Yet,	  Georgia	  was	  one	  of	  the	  FSU	  countries	  that	  experienced	  a	  high	  level	  of	  economic	  liberalization	  and	  thus,	  economic	   dispersion.	   Shevardnadze	   started	   to	   deal	   effectively	   with	   economic	  issues	  only	   from	  1994,	  when	  he	   launched	   the	   “anti-­‐crisis	  program”	   in	  order	   to	  recover	   from	   the	   mistakes	   of	   the	   “populist	   economic	   reform”	   occurred	   from	  December	   1991	   till	   early	   1992	   and	   from	   the	   unaccomplished	   Shock	   Therapy	  (Papava,	  2012)6.	  From	  1994	  Shevardnadze	  started	  to	  take	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  recommendations	  seriously	  and	  to	  carry	  out	  some	  of	   the	  reforms	  envisaged	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Because	  the	  other	  parties	  that	  overcame	  the	  5%	  threshold	  scored	  8%	  (National	  Democratic	  Party)	  and	  6.8%	  (All	  Georgian	  Revival	  Union)	  5	  Both	  were	  arrested	  in	  1995:	  Ioselani	  because	  he	  was	  accused	  to	  having	  connection	  with	  the	  attempted	  car	  bombing	  of	  Shevardnadze,	  whereas	  Kitovani	  was	  arrested	  after	  having	  attempted	  to	  lead	  a	  para-­‐military	  attack	  to	  Abkhazia	  with	  Mkhedrioni	  militia.	  6	  During	  this	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  Georgia	  experienced	  the	  Shock	  Therapy,	  which	  was	  introduced	  in	  post-­‐Communist	  countries	  by	  former	  Polish	  finance	  minister	  Leszek	  Balcerowicz	  This	  plan	  entails	  the	  simultaneous	  adoption	  of	  measures	  concerned	  with	  price	  liberalization	  and	  reduction	  of	  national	  budget	  deficit	  (see	  Papava,	  2012:	  2-­‐7)	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the	   international	   institutions7.	   Meanwhile	   the	   government	   strengthened	   the	  privatizations’	  plan	  aimed	  to	  preserve	  the	  redistribution	  of	  assets	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  state	  officials	  and	  their	  clients	   (Radnitz,	  2010:135).	  Among	  the	  state	  officials,	  a	  former	   Communist	   Party	   leader,	   Avtandil	   Margiani,	   played	   a	   prominent	  “anchoring”	  role;	  he	  was	  appointed	  as	  deputy’s	  prime	  minister	  and	  represented	  the	   vested	   interests	   of	   the	   head	   of	   state	   enterprise	   at	   the	   top	   levels	   of	  government	   (Slider,	   1997:192).	   In	   addiction,	   despite	   the	   IMF	   and	  World	   Bank	  advices,	   Shevardnadze	   never	   fully	   committed	   his	   administration	   to	   specific	  policies	   in	  the	  economic	  sector,	   in	   fact	   the	  economic	  policy	  and	  social	  model	   in	  Georgia	  used	  to	  be	  “adjusted	  to	  the	   interest	  of	   the	  rent-­‐seeking	  part	  of	  society”	  (Gogolashvili,	   2011:173).	   Yet,	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   dynamics	   could	   not	   prevent	   the	  development	   of	   an	   independent	   economic	   class.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   facts,	   the	  economic	  pluralism,	  developed	  prior	  to	  2003,	  allowed	  some	  businessmen	  to	  set	  up	   political	   parties,	   which	   fostered	   criticisms	   over	   government	   economic	  management	   (Radnitz,	   2010:135),	   such	   as	   the	   New	   Rights,	   funded	   by	   David	  Gamkrelidze	  in	  June	  2001	  that	  started	  to	  ask	  for	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  budget	  deficit.	  Moreover,	   some	   other	   started	   to	   develop	   independent	   media,	   such	   as	   Badri	  Patarkatsishvili	   who	   funded	   Imedi	   Media	   Holding	   a	   broadcasting	   station	  extremely	   critical	   to	   Shevardnadze.	   In	   addiction,	   the	   third	   sector	   (mainly	  composed	   by	   NGO)	   could	   grow	   impressively	   thanks	   to	   significant	   financial	  resources	   that	   were	   beyond	   Shevardnadze	   control	   (often	   foreign	   sponsored)	  (Wheatley,	   2010:363).	   Economic	  pluralism	  assured	   the	  presence	  of	   actors	   that	  were	  not	  anchored	  to	  the	  system;	  these	  elements	  were	  at	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  Rose	  Revolutions,	  which	  soon	  after	  took	  place.	  	  	  Shevardnadze	   was	   able	   to	   set	   up	   and	   consolidate	   a	   stable	   hybrid	   regime	   that	  allowed	  himself	  to	  rule	  from	  1995	  until	  2001,	  when	  after	  some	  elites	  defections	  and	   the	  growing	  discontent	  about	   the	   inability	   to	  cope	  with	  budgetary	  crisis,	   a	  real	  and	  a	  challenging	  opposition	  started	  to	  develop.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Thanks	  to	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  activities	  Georgia	  succeeded	  in	  attaining	  macroeconomic	  stability	  and	  in	  building	  up	  its	  financial	  system,	  even	  if	  IFM	  and	  World	  Bank	  recommendation	  proved	  to	  be	  wrong	  in	  many	  cases	  (see	  Papava,	  2012:17-­‐22)	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The	  Rose	  Revolution	  	  Many	   and	   various	   interpretations	   have	   been	   made	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   Rose	  Revolution.	   For	   the	   sake	   of	   the	   argument,	   my	   interest	   is	   focused	   on	  understanding	   the	   possible	   destabilisation	   of	   the	   elites	   and	   thus	   the	   de-­‐anchoring	   process	   of	   the	   hybrid	   regime.	   By	   the	   way,	   there	   is	   a	   general	  understanding	   that	   the	  worsening	  of	  economic	  conditions	  and	  elites	  defections	  allowed	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   favourable	   environment	   to	   a	   change.	   Taking	   into	  account	  the	  Theory	  of	  anchoring	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  interpret	  this	  piecemeal	  drift	  as	  “more	   or	   less	   gradual	   breaking	   up	   or	   destructuration	   of	   those	   institution	   and	  vested	   interests”	   (Morlino,	   2011:113),	   in	   which	   the	   anchors	   might	   break	   and	  unbind.	  	  	  At	  the	  time	  Georgia	  was	  witnessing	  a	  deep	  structural	  crisis	  triggered	  by	  a	  huge	  budgetary	   deficit.	   This	   in	   turn,	   provoked	   high	   level	   of	   disaffection	   by	   some	  economic	  elites	  that	  started	  to	  openly	  criticise	  the	  government	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  system.	   A	   young	   but	   charismatic	   leader,	   Mikhail	   Saakashvili	   who	   was	   the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  under	  Shevardnadze	  government	  was	  ready	  to	  ride	  the	  wave	  of	   the	  moment	   and	   declaring	   that	   he	   could	   not	   bear	   anymore	   the	   corrupt	   and	  inefficient	  systems	  of	  the	  country.	  Shevardnadze’s	  peculiar	  way	  of	  managing	  the	  country	  began	  to	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  narrower	  power	  elite,	  and	  “clear	  signs	  of	   ‘state	  capture’	  appeared”	  (Gegeshidze,	  2011:32).	  The	  parliamentary	  election,	  scheduled	   for	   November	   2003,	   brought	   under	   the	   spotlight	   the	   unsustainable	  neo-­‐patrimonial	   system	  and	   thus	  other	  members	  of	   the	  economic	  and	  political	  elites	   started	   to	   take	   the	   distances	   from	   Shevardnadze	   administration8.	   The	  election	   was	   marred	   by	   fraud,	   and	   despite	   Shevardnadze	   claimed	   victory	   the	  Georgia	  Supreme	  Court	  nullify	  the	  result	  of	  elections.	  Shevardnadze	  began	  to	  be	  stigmatized	   and	   became	   the	   “lame	   duck”	   to	   which	   everyone	   pointed	   to;	  meanwhile	   the	  CUG	   collapsed,	   and	   thus	   the	   political	   and	   clientelistic	   networks	  disentangled	   with	   the	   actors,	   with	   the	   society	   and	   with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   elites.	  	  Shevardnadze	   did	   not	  want	   to	   resign	   and	   he	   asked	   for	   help	   to	   Abashidze	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  example:	  Nino	  Burdjanadze	  (Chairman	  of	  the	  Parliament	  of	  Georgia),	  Zurab	  Zhvania	  (CUG	  General	  Secretary	  and	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Parliament	  of	  Georgia),	  David	  Bezhuashvili	  (Director	  of	  Sakgazi	  –	  Georgian	  Gas),	  Temur	  Chkonia	  (owner	  of	  Coca-­‐Cola	  Georgia	  and	  McDonald	  Georgia).	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Kvitsiani.	  Truly,	   the	  anchors	  with	  the	  warlords	  functioned	  until	   the	  very	  end	  of	  Shevardnadze	   regime:	   Abashidze	   and	   his	   Revival	   Party	   remained	   loyal	   and	  provided	   support	   to	   Shevardnadze	   until	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   Rose	   Revolution,	  providing	  the	  president	  with	  electoral	  votes	  from	  their	  constituencies	  and	  with	  supporting	  manifestations	   in	  Tbilisi.	   In	   the	  capital	  during	   those	  days	   there	  was	  also	  Kvitsiani,	  who	  was	  there	  to	  sustain	  Shevardnadze	  government	  that	  granted	  him	   the	   laud	  of	  Georgian	  patriot	   for	  his	  merits	   for	  defending	   the	   country	   from	  attacks	  by	  Abkhazian	  and	  Russian	  forces	  (Marten,	  2012:90).	  However,	  with	  the	  Parliament	   surrounded	   by	   Saakashvili’s	   supporters,	   which	   sought	   for	   a	  resignation	   of	   Shevardnadze,	   warlords	   and	   theirs	   followers	   could	   little	   in	  avoiding	  the	  crowd	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  parliament.	  Soon	  after	  Shevardnadze	  had	  to	  fly	  out	  from	  the	  country.	  	  Thus,	  Shevardnadze	  could	  not	  rely	  anymore	  on	  the	  complex	  networks	  of	  support	  he	  set	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  all	  along	  the	  duration	  of	  his	  presidency.	  In	  addiction,	  despite	  tools	  for	  institutional	  manipulation	  were	  at	  the	  disposal	  for	  incumbent	  to	  assure	   their	   holding	   in	   power	   (including	   elections),	   Shevardnadze	   did	   not	  succeed	   in	   managing	   the	   forthcoming	   elections	   and	   thus	   he	   did	   not	   manage	  properly	   to	   cope	   with,	   what	   Schedler	   calls,	   the	   institutional	   and	   informational	  
uncertainties	  that	  characterize	  hybrid	  regimes;	  in	  a	  last	  tentative	  he	  launched	  his	  pro-­‐government	  initiative,	  a	  coalitions	  of	  leaders	  and	  parties,	  called	  “For	  a	  New	  Georgia”,	  aimed	  to	  grab	  still	  some	  consensus	  and	  to	  provide	  his	  few	  supporters	  with	   what	   would	   resemble	   an	   organizational	   power,	   however	   this	   tentative	  failed	  to	  bring	  unity	  in	  a	  fragmented	  political	  environment.	  	  	  Notwithstanding	   Cory	   Welt	   finds	   a	   paradox	   when	   he	   asserts	   that	   Rose	  Revolution	   happened	   in	   a	   country	   that	   “moved	   further	   down	   a	   democratic	  pathway	   than	   those	   that	   have	   not”	   (Welt,	   2010:188),	   I	   would	   claim	   that	   it	   is	  exactly	   “this	   set	   of	   ambiguous	   institutions”	   (Morlino,	   2008:7),	  which	   implies	   a	  higher	   level	   of	   uncertainty	   on	   the	   stabilisation	   of	   the	   regime	   and	   makes	   the	  management	  of	  a	  crisis	  more	  challenging.	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  However,	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   these	   kinds	   of	   crises	   and	   post-­‐elections	  protests	  have	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  real	  revolutionary	  moment	  in	  terms	  of	  regime	  change	  (through	   the	   transitology	   paradigm).	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   facts,	   the	  Rose	  Revolution	  did	  bring	   to	  an	  end	   the	  Shevardnadze’s	  presidency	  and	  system,	  however	   it	  did	  not	  bring	  to	  an	  end	  the	  hybridity	  of	  the	  system.	  Therefore,	  according	  to	  Henry	  E.	  Hale,	   elite	   de-­‐consolidation	   and	   post-­‐elections	   protests	   against	   unpopular	  incumbents	   “can	   be	   an	   integral	   part”	   of	   hybrid	   regimes’	   accountability	  mechanism	  (Hale,	  2006;	  2011:39).	  Given	  the	  high-­‐level	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  hybrid	  regime,	   every	   time	   there	   is	   a	   change	   in	   the	   elites	   settlement	   a	   process	   of	   re-­‐consolidation	   occurs.	   This	   happens	   in	   so	   far	   as	   in	   hybrid	   regimes	   elites	  stabilisation	   plays	   a	  major	   role	   in	   consolidating	   the	   regime.	   Elites	   and	   society	  bound	  together	  through	  anchors	  are	  part	  of	  the	  consolidating	  process;	  therefore,	  in	   case	   of	   crisis	   and	   de-­‐structuration,	   the	   regime	   has	   to	   undertake	   a	   new	  consolidating	   moment,	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   anchors	   among	   the	   most	  important	   actors	   with	   interests	   at	   stake	   as	   a	   cyclic	   phase	   of	   hybrid	  accountability.	  	  
The	  Second	  Consolidation:	  Saakashvili’s	  Presidency	  	  There	   was	   no	   surprise	   looking	   at	   the	   high	   turnout	   of	   presidential	   election	   in	  January	   2004,	   when	   Saakashvili	   was	   elected	   president	   with	   96%	   of	   the	  preferences.	   People	   expected	   a	   real	   change	   and	  massively	   participated	   in	   this	  “new	  turn”	  elections	  (more	  than	  80%	  of	  turnout).	  However,	  even	  these	  “victory	  elections”	   were	   marred	   by	   fraud	   and	   irregularities	   (ODHIR,	   2004),	  demonstrating	   how	   Saakashvili	   started	   to	   use	   immediately	   one	   of	   the	  institutional	  management	  methods	  that	  characterize	  hybrid	  regime.	  As	  Wheatley	  writes	  about	  the	  2003	  and	  2008	  elections,	  “the	  purpose	  of	  elections	  in	  Georgia	  is	  not	   to	   give	   voters	   the	   opportunity	   to	   replace	   their	   government,	   but	   to	   confer	  legitimacy	  on	  the	  incumbent	  regime”	  (Wheatley,	  2010:374).	  	  	  After	   the	   elections	   Saakashvili	   started	   immediately	   to	   address	   many	   issues	   in	  several	  sectors	  and	  reformed	  the	  1995	  Constitutions.	  In	  the	  election’s	  campaign	  Saakashvili	  promised	  that	  he	  would	  restore	  full	  control	  over	  Georgian	  territory	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and	  would	  have	  harshly	  combat	  corruption.	  Hereby,	  it	  follows	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  three	   linchpins	   that	   I	   presented	   so	   far;	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   observe	   substantial	  differences	  with	  Shevardnadze	  system,	  demonstrating	  how	  Saakashvili	  acted	  to	  re-­‐structure	   the	   anchors	   engaging	   in	   a	   different	   way	   with	   the	   main	   actors	   of	  Georgian’s	  society.	  	  As	  far	  as	  the	  situation	  with	  the	  warlords	  is	  concerned,	  Saakashvili	  demonstrated	  since	   the	   beginning	   that	   he	   was	   not	   satisfied	   with	   the	   “accommodating”	  behaviour	   of	   the	   previous	   presidency.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   facts,	   Abashidze	   and	  Kvitsiani	   were	   integrative	   parts	   of	   the	   Shevardnadze	   rule,	   thus	   Saakashvili	  decided	  to	  get	  rid	  off	  them	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  First	  of	  all,	  Saakashvili	  indicated	  that	   it	   considered	   those	   conditions	   in	   Abkhazia	   and	   South	   Ossetia	   to	   be	  intolerable	  and	  would	  have	  taken	  active	  measures	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflicts	  (Nodia,	  2005:53).	   Subsequently,	   thanks	   to	   his	   populist	   appeal,	   Saakashvili	  was	   able	   to	  starkly	  contrast	  both	  the	  warlords	  in	  their	  own	  regions.	  	  	  Abashidze	   after	   the	   Rose	   Revolution	   condemned	   the	   coup	   and	   closed	   Ajara’s	  border	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  Georgia,	  declaring	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  (Civil	  Georgia,	  2003).	   In	   January	   2004	   Saakashvili	   launched	   an	   investigation	   on	   the	   illegal	  traffics	   and	   activities	   in	   Ajara	   and	   on	   one	   of	   the	   major	   financial	   funders	   of	  Abashidze,	   the	   Omega	   Group	   (Marten,	   2012:78).	   Notwithstanding	   these	  developments	   rekindled	   ancient	   tensions,	   Abashidze’s	   Revival	   Party	   run	   for	  election	  in	  Georgian’s	  parliament	  but	  failed	  to	  overcome	  the	  threshold.	  After	  this	  failure,	   Saakashvili	   arrested	   the	   Georgian	   military	   commander	   in	   Batumi,	  General	   Dumbadze,	   for	   not	   having	   obeyed	   to	   Tbilisi’s	   orders	   and	   took	   direct	  control	  of	  the	  25th	  Brigade	  based	  in	  Batumi	  (Marten,	  2012:79).	  In	  the	  meantime	  Abashidze	  was	  loosing	  the	  control	  of	  Ajara	  and	  of	  the	  support	  by	  the	  local	  elites,	  whereas	   Tbilisi’s	   forces	   step	   by	   step	   took	   control	   of	   all	   the	   strategic	   centres.	  Abashidze	  eventually	  left	  the	  country	  on	  May	  6,	  2004,	  and	  Saakashvili	  re-­‐gained	  the	  control	  over	  Ajara	  without	  firing	  a	  shot.	  Saakashvili’s	  popularity	  allowed	  the	  president	   to	  make	  promises,	  which	  would	  allow	  him	   to	  gain	   support	   from	   this	  part	   of	   the	   country;	   yet,	   soon	   after	   the	   overthrow	   of	   Abashidze,	   Saakashvili	  appointed	  as	  governor	  of	  the	  region	  his	  old	  friend	  Levan	  Varshalomidze	  (he	  was	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Saakashvili’s	  personal	   representative	   to	  Ajara)(Marten,	  2012:81),	  whom	  would	  have	  guaranteed	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  loyalty	  to	  his	  presidency.	  	  	  For	  what	   concern	   Kvitsiani	   and	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   Upper	   Kodori,	   there	  were	  external	   pressures	   in	   order	   to	   not	   alter	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   (Marten,	   2012:91).	  However,	  Saakashvili	  decided	  in	  December	  2004,	  after	  having	  settled	  down	  the	  situation	  in	  Ajara,	   to	  abolish	  the	  post	  of	  special	  representative	  to	  Upper	  Kodori	  held	  by	  Kvitsiani	  (Civil	  Georgia,	  2004).	  This	  move,	  triggered	  harsh	  reaction	  in	  the	  region	  and	  Kvitsiani’s	  militia	  decided	   to	   continue	   their	   “securitizing”	  operation	  even	  in	  the	  illegality.	  The	  situation	  degenerated	  and	  Kvitsiani	  launched	  an	  alarm	  to	  journalists	  saying	  that	  Tbilisi	  was	  ready	  to	  invade	  Upper	  Kodori	  with	  the	  army	  in	   order	   to	   gain	   the	   control	   of	   the	   region	   by	   force,	   thus	   violating	   the	   case-­‐fire	  agreement	   of	   1994	   with	   Abkhazia.	   Russia	   intervened	   warning	   Saakashvili	   to	  avoid	   use	   of	   force	   in	   Upper	   Kodori.	   Notwithstanding	   these	   antecedents,	   on	   25	  July	   2006	   Tbilisi	   forces	   entered	   to	   Upper	   Kodori	   and	   arrested	   Kvitsiani	   in	   a	  special	  “police	  operation”9.	  The	  mission	  was	  accomplished	  with	  facility	  because	  according	   to	   Marten,	   “a	   successful	   deal	   was	   worked	   out	   by	   Saakashvili	  administration	   beforehand	   to	   woo	   Kvitsiani’s	   supporter	   away	   from	   him”	  (Marten,	  2012:94).	  Soon	  after	   the	  “police	  operation”	  Tbilisi	  was	  able	   to	  restore	  full	   control	   over	   the	   region	   that	   was	   renamed	   Upper	   Abkhazia.	   In	   the	  subsequently	   months,	   the	   government	   lavished	   the	   region	   with	   millions	   of	  dollars	  aimed	  at	  many	  projects	  of	  local	  developments.	  	  	  Despite	   this	   swifts	   and	   smooth	   developments	   in	   dealing	   with	   Upper	   Kodori,	  Saakashvili’s	   action	   kindled	   security	   and	   separatists	   stances	   in	   Abkhazia	   and	  consequently	   in	  Russia.	   Kvitsiani	  managed	   to	   escape	   soon	   after	   the	   arrest	   and	  then	   moved	   to	   Sukhumi	   under	   the	   protection	   of	   Russian	   forces	   (Marten,	  2012:97).	  The	  August	  2008	  Russian-­‐Georgian	  war	  saw	  the	  active	  participation	  of	  Abkhazian	  troops,	  which	  moved	  firstly	  into	  Upper	  Kodori.	  This	  region	  at	  the	  end	  of	   the	  war	  has	  been	   extremely	   contested,	   but	   in	  2010	  Kvitsiani’s	   nephew	   took	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In	  spite	  of	  what	  declared	  by	  the	  Government	  regarding	  the	  “police	  operation”,	  media	  and	  Russian	  Authorities	  spoke	  about	  a	  real	  “military	  operation”	  which	  would	  broke	  the	  agreement	  of	  1994.	  Civil	  Georgia	  writes	  that	  “A	  military	  convoy	  of	  Georgian	  30	  Kamaz-­‐type	  trucks,	  18	  Niva	  off-­‐road	  cars	  and	  two	  armoured	  vehicles	  are	  moving	  towards	  Kodori	  gorge	  in	  breakaway	  Abkhazia”	  (Civil	  Georgia,	  2006)	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the	  political	  control	  of	  Upper	  Kodori	  (Marten,	  2012:	  99)	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  Saakashvili	  project	  over	  the	  region	  was	  illusory.	  Removing	  the	  actor	  playing	  the	  anchoring	   role	   proved	   to	   be	   fallacious,	   in	   addiction	   the	   re-­‐organization	   of	   the	  vested	   interest	   throughout	   the	   new	   policies	   (such	   as	   the	   high	   promises	   of	  political	  and	  economic	  cooperation)	  did	  not	  work	  as	  supposed.	  Yet,	  Saakashvili	  was	   aware	   about	   the	   complex	   and	   dangerous	   situation	   with	   Abkhazia,	   but	   he	  was	  resolute	  to	  re-­‐gain	  the	  full	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  country	  insofar	  it	  was	  a	  pillar	  of	  his	  consolidation’s	  project.	  This	  strategic	  move	  would	  affect	  the	  integrity	  of	  its	  regime	  and	  weakened	  his	  position	  vis	  à	  vis	  some	  domestic	  actors.	  However,	  the	  Georgia-­‐Russia	  war	  in	  August	  2008	  the	  “Cyprusization”	  of	  the	  contested	  regions	  allowed	   Saakashvili	   to	   remove	   elements	   of	   ambiguity10	  regarding	   his	   policy	  toward	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  Abkhazia	  (Papava,	  2012;	  Nodia,	  2012:	  729).	  For	  Tbilisi	  the	  new	  interlocutor	  was	  Moscow,	  and	  no	  more	  local	   leaderships	  (warlords)	   in	  both	   the	   regions,	  which	   from	   that	   time	  on	  were	   considered	  as	  Russian’s	  proxy	  regimes.	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  hybrid	  regime	  regarding	  the	  political	  sphere,	  Saakashvili	   adopted	   several	   provisions,	   which	   made	   clear	   that	   he	   was	   not	  following	   policies	   aimed	   at	   democratize	   the	   country,	   but	   instead	   they	   were	  aimed	  at	  strengthening	  the	  President’s	  powers.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  acts	  Saakashvili	  accomplished	  was	  passing	  amendments	  of	  the	  constitutions,	  which	  allowed	  him	  to	  dissolute	  the	  parliament	  in	  case	  of	  necessity	  and	  deprived	  it	  with	  the	  power	  to	  amend	  the	  budget	  or	  to	  question	  the	  government’s	  annual	  report	  on	  budgetary	  obligations	  (Dolidze,	  2007),	  thus	  limiting	  the	  separation	  of	  power.	  According	  to	  some	   analysts	   (Fairbanks	   and	   Gugushvili,	   2013;	   Filippini,	   2005;	   Di	   Quirico,	  2013),	   Russian	   presidential	   model	   would	   have	   inspired	   Saakashvili	  constitutional	   reform	   (as	   well	   as	   other	   cases	   such	   as	   Kazakhstan	   and	  Kyrgyzstan),	   which	   granted	   the	   executive	   with	   extraordinary	   powers.	  Saakashvili	  was	  able	   to	   carry	  out	   these	   reforms	   thanks	   to	  a	  political	  unity	   that	  conceded	   him	   unusual	   liberties	   to	   act.	   One	   of	   the	   key	   players	   in	   securing	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Such	  as	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  separatists	  regions	  in	  the	  country	  (which	  was	  the postponed 
to the indefinite future), and	  the	  role	  of	  Russia,	  which	  before	  the	  conflict	  pretended	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  neutral	  power.	   
	   20	  
favouring	  environment	  was	  the	  United	  National	  Movement	  (UNM)	  –	  Saakashvili	  political	  machine,	   considered	   a	   “party	   of	   power”	   (Wheatley,	   2010:	   351)	   for	   its	  role	   in	   including	   many	   important	   Georgian	   stakeholders.	   The	   United	   National	  Movement	   always	   rejected	   accusations	   of	   merger	   with	   the	   state	   apparatus	  (Nodia;	  Scholtbach,	  2006:57),	  in	  fact	  many	  of	  newly	  appointed	  high-­‐level	  figures	  came	  from	  close	  circles	  that	  gravitated	  around	  Saakashvili	  and	  his	  party:	  Kakha	  Lomania	  (Minister	  of	  Education	  and	  former	  member	  of	  SOROS	  foundation),	  Giga	  Bokeria	  and	  Givi	  Targamadze	  (entered	  into	  parliament,	  before	  they	  both	  worked	  at	   Liberty	   Institue),	   Vano	   Merabishvili	   (Minister	   of	   internal	   affairs	   and	  previously	   Secretary	   general	   of	   Saakashvili	   National	   Movement);	   as	  Muskhelishvili	  and	  Jorjolani	  claim,	  soon	  after	  the	  Rose	  Revolution	  the	  UNM	  was	  able	   to	   encroach	   “upon	   the	   sphere	   of	   almost	   all	   civil	   society	   institutions:	  university	   organizations,	   and	   professional	   union	   (Muskhelishvili	   and	   Jorjolani,	  2009:694).	  In	  addiction,	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  the	  Saakashvili	  presidency	  there	  has	  been	  a	  massive	  turnover	  in	  the	  public	  administration,	  around	  20.000	  among	  policeman,	  tax	  collector	  and	  custom	  officers	  were	  removed	  from	  their	  posts	  and	  replaced	  by	  people	  from	  the	  civil	  society	  (Timm,	  2012:174).	  Thanks	  to	  this	  huge	  operation	   the	   government	   polished	   up	   those	   institutions	   that	  were	   crucial	   for	  the	  Shevardnadze	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  system.	  	  	  All	   those	   invasive	   policies	  were	   justified	   by	   the	   government	   that	   stressed	   that	  they	  were	  caused	  by	  requirements	  of	  radical	  reform	  in	  the	  state	  apparatus	  and	  the	  need	   to	  uproot	   corruption	   (Nodia;	  Scholtbach,	  2006:57).	  Yet,	   the	  UNM	  was	  becoming,	  even	  more	  than	  in	  Shevardnadze	  era,	  the	  centre	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  posts	   and	   offices,	   the	   hub	   for	   the	   informal	   networks	   that	   underpinned	  Saakashvili’s	   regime.	   A	   high	   level	   of	   rotation	   characterized	   the	   mechanism	   of	  appointing	   civil	   servants,	   state	   officials	   and	   administrative	   staff.	   As	   Timm	  explains,	  “the	  unpredictability	  of	  rotation	  ensures	  that	  actors	  seek	  to	  hedge	  their	  power	  base	  not	  within	  the	  subsystem	  they	  currently	  command	  but	  towards	  the	  ruling	  elite”	  (Timm	  2012:176)	  in	  this	  way	  it	  allowed	  both	  the	  prevention	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  oppositions’	  streams	  and	  the	  strengthening	  of	  informal	  relationships.	  Thus,	  as	  Timm	  continues,	  “the	  Saakashvili’s	  administration	  fell	  back	  on	  another	  proven	   instrument	   –	   the	   installation	   of	   a	   governmental	   party	   as	   political	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machine.	   This	   decision	   triggered	   a	   new	   cycle	   of	   neopatrimonial	   relationship”	  (Timm	  2012:177).	  Saakashvili	   therefore	  did	  not	  want	   to	  proceed	  toward	  a	  real	  democratization	  of	  the	  country,	  instead	  it	  re-­‐constructed	  informal	  networks	  and	  institutional	  manipulations,	  which	  re-­‐consolidated	  the	  hybridity	  of	  the	  Georgian	  political	  system.	  	  However,	  Saakashvili’s	  government	  faced	  a	  first	  massive	  political	  crisis	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2007,	  when	  part	  of	  the	  Georgian	  population	  started	  to	  manifest	  openly	  against	  the	  lack	  of	  representation	  within	  the	  state	  apparatus.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  facts,	  one	  of	  the	   main	   failures	   of	   the	   Saakashvili	   administration	   was	   the	   population’s	  impossibility	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   political	   sphere,	   even	   at	   local	   level	   (Jawad,	  2008:	   152).	   This	   triggered	   the	   feelings	   of	   powerless	   and	   betrayal	   among	   the	  population	   excluded	   by	   the	   Saakashvili’s	   political	   machine.	   Notwithstanding	  people	  disaffections,	  the	  crisis	  was	  initiated	  by	  the	  arrest	  of	  a	  former	  member	  of	  the	   government,	   Irakli	   Okruashvili 11 ,	   who	   announced	   the	   creation	   of	   an	  opposition	   party	   (Movement	   of	   United	   Georgia).	   Soon	   after	   the	   launch	   of	   his	  party,	   Okruashvili	  was	   detained	  with	   several	   charges	   concerning	   his	   period	   in	  office	   as	   Defence	   minister;	   in	   response	   to	   this,	   many	   members	   of	   parliament	  passed	   to	   the	   opposition’s	   seats	   inflating	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   United	   Public	  Movement.	   This	   political	   group	   organized	   one	   of	   the	   largest	  manifestations	   in	  contemporary	   Georgia,	   which	   ended	   up	   in	   violent	   clashes	   with	   police.	   The	  government	  declared	   the	   state	  of	   emergency	  and	   some	  opposition	  media	  were	  closed	   down;	   Saakashvili	   resigned	   and	   new	   presidential	   elections	   were	  scheduled	   for	   January	   8,	   2008.	   Despite	   international	   observers	   described	   the	  election	  as	  “democratic”	  (OSCE/ODIHR	  2008:2)	  Saakashvili	  was	  re-­‐elected,	  with	  53%	  of	  the	  vote,	  in	  an	  election	  marred	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  second	  round,	  it	  wan	  moreover	   characterized	   by	  massively	   state	   resources	   used	   for	   campaigning	   in	  Saakashvili	   favour,	   by	   implausible	   voter	   turnout,	   by	   selective	   cancellation	   of	  election	  results	  and	  by	  other	   institutional	  manipulations	  concerning	  voting	  and	  elections	  procedures	  (OSCE/ODIHR	  2008).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Okruashvili	  was	  the	  former	  minister	  of	  Defence	  and	  was	  very	  popular	  among	  the	  population	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For	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  despite	  some	  defections	  among	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  incumbent	  elite,	  most	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  and	  politicians	  remained	  closed	  to	  Saakashvili	  and	  to	  UNM,	  demonstrating	  how	  well	  functioning	  was	   the	   rotation	   system	   established	   by	   the	   President.	   Tensions	   with	   the	  opposition	  remained	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Saakashvili	  era:	  the	  opposition	  parties	  suffered	  many	  attempts	  to	  be	  co-­‐opt,	  marginalized	  and	  divided,	  and	  in	  fact	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  election	  in	  2012	  none	  would	  imagine	  that	  there	  would	  be	  other	  political	  parties	  able	  to	  challenge	  the	  Saakashvili’s	  National	  Movement.	  Moreover,	   for	  what	   concern	   the	  presidential	   election	   in	  2013,	   the	  President	   of	  Georgia	   was	   securing	   his	   power	   through	   a	   Constitutional	   reform	   that	   would	  allow	   the	  prime	  minister	   to	  acquire	  more	  prerogative	  vis	  à	  vis	   the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic;	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  due	  to	  legal	  provision	  Saakashvili	  was	  unable	  to	  re-­‐run	   for	   a	   new	   mandate	   as	   a	   president	   of	   the	   republic:	   with	   the	   new	  constitutional	   reform,	   Saakashvili	   attempted	   to	   follow	   the	   example	   of	   Putin-­‐Medvedev	  tandem.	  	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  at	  this	  point,	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	   Saakashvili	   regime,	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	   effects	   that	   the	   short	  war	  with	  Russia	  had	   on	   Saakashvili’s	   regime.	   Despite	   attempts	   to	   provoke	   a	   regime	   change	   by	  some	   opposition	   groups	   (Nodia,	   2012),	   the	   war	   with	   Russia	   was	   not	   a	   major	  source	   of	   instability	   for	   the	   government;	   taking	   into	   consideration	   data	   from	  Caucasus	  Barometer	  concerning	  “trust	  in	  the	  president”	  it	  shows	  that	  since	  2008	  the	   percentage	   of	   people	   that	   trusted	   or	   fully	   trusted	   the	   president	   was	  constantly	  rising	  till	  201212.	  According	  to	  Nodia,	  “save	  for	  the	  separatist	  regions,	  the	  results	  of	   the	  war	  were	  not	  as	  dramatic	  as	   the	   initial	  shock	  had	  suggested”	  (Nodia,	  2012:	  723);	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   facts,	   if	  we	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   first	  source	  of	  concerns	  for	  Georgian	  people	  in	  2008	  it	  was	  territorial	  integrity	  (20%)	  followed	   by	   relations	   with	   Russia	   (16%),	   whereas	   issues	   such	   as	   fairness	   of	  elections	   or	   corruption	   were	   at	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   list	   (with	   respectively	   3%	  fairness	  of	  elections	  and	  6%	  corruption)	  (data	  from	  Caucasus	  Barometer	  2008).	  However	  the	  “shock	  of	  war”	  lasted	  for	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  already	  in	  2009	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Figures	  concerning	  people	  trusting	  and	  fully	  trusting	  the	  president	  (total)	  2008:	  51%;	  in	  2009:	  48;	  in	  2010:	  56%;	  in	  2011:	  58%	  (data	  from	  Caucasus	  barometer)	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biggest	   issue	  of	   concern	   for	  Georgian	  was	  unemployment	  at	  33%,	  and	   relation	  with	   Russia	   fell	   to	   a	   mere	   5%	   (Caucasus	   Barometer,	   2009).	   In	   addiction	   the	  Georgian	  government	  could	  profit	  from	  at	  least	  two	  main	  developments:	  the	  first	  one	  was	  the	  renewed	  popular	  support,	  given	  that	  Georgian	  people	  blamed	  Russia	  to	   have	   started	   the	   war;	   secondly	   Georgia	   benefited	   of	   a	   huge	   assistant	   aid	  package	  from	  the	  West	  (around	  4.5	  million	  dollars),	  which	  allowed	  the	  country	  to	  suffer	  less,	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  from	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  regional	  economies	  (Papava,	  2012:	  64).	  In	  terms	  of	  international	  relations,	  the	   war	   enhanced	   the	   Western	   attention	   toward	   the	   country	   (almost	   60%	   of	  people	  endorsed	  NATO	  membership	   for	  Georgia	   in	  2009	  –	  data	   from	  Caucasus	  Barometer,	  2009),	  in	  particular	  cooperation	  with	  the	  EU	  became	  more	  important	  and	  in	  June	  2011	  negotiation	  for	  the	  Association	  Agreements	  were	  launched.	  	  	  Lead	   Georgia	   toward	   the	  West	   and	   on	   the	   path	   of	   a	   prosperous	   liberal	   future	  were	   two	   of	   the	  major	   linchpins	   of	   Saakashvili’s	   rhetoric.	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   facts	  Saakashvili’s	  regime	  differed	  from	  Shevardnadze’s	  one	  also	  for	  what	  concern	  the	  ideological	   justification	   of	   government’s	   policies.	   Libertarianism	   and	  modernisation	   were	   the	   fortes	   of	   United	   National	   Movements,	   even	   with	   an	  authoritarian	  outlook	  (Jobelius,	  2012).	  According	  to	  Jobelius	  this	  ideology	  would	  served	   for	   at	   least	   three	   goals:	   first	   of	   all	   the	   ideology	   could	   justify	   the	  strengthening	   of	   power	   through	   modernization’s	   imperatives;	   secondly	   the	  ideology	   provided	   with	   clear-­‐cut	   relationship	   with	   like-­‐minded	   people,	  subsequently	  furnishing	  the	  incumbent	  elite	  with	  stigmatising	  arguments	  against	  those	   who	   “did	   not	   want	   Georgia	   to	   become	   modern”;	   thirdly	   Libertarianism	  helped	   the	   government	   to	   cope	   with	   undesirable	   coalition	   of	   players	   or	  stakeholders.	   Truly,	   Georgia	   became	   pointed	   as	   a	   successful	   example	   by	  international	   observer,	   which	   endorsed	   the	   reforms,	   including	   the	   most	  controversial:	   the	   labour	   code	   reform.	   Thanks	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   neo-­‐liberal	  reforms	  Georgia	   scaled	   from	   the	   112th	   position	   in	   2005	   to	   12th	   position	   in	   the	  
Doing	  Business’s	  chart.	  	  	  With	   the	  2009	  Economic	  Liberty	  Act,	   the	  government	  sought	   to	  strengthen	   the	  international	   status	   of	   Georgian	   economy	   thanks	   to	   some	   provision	   aimed	   at	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removing	   obstacle	   to	   external	   investments,	   to	   avoid	   price	   regulations	   and	   to	  avoid	  the	   introduction	  of	   further	  regulatory	  institutions.	  However,	  according	  to	  some	   critics	   there	   were	   no	   urgencies	   to	   adopt	   these	   provisions,	   in	   particular	  because	  Georgia	  already	  had	  a	   law	  on	   foreign	   investments	  and	  management	  of	  profits	  since	  13	  years	  at	  that	  time	  (Papava,	  2012:	  66).	  Beside	  this	  act	  that	  was	  in	  line	  with	  liberal	  economist	  receipts,	  the	  government	  was	  domestically	  adopting	  a	  political	  economy	  that	  was	  all	  but	  liberal.	  Some	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “rosy	  mistakes”	  as	   former	   minister	   of	   Georgian	   economy,	   Vladimer	   Papava,	   labelled	   them	  included:	  illegal	  sales	  of	  state	  properties,	  restriction	  of	  competitions,	  violation	  of	  property,	  manipulation	  of	  statistical	  data,	  plan	  to	  reduce	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  National	  Bank	  of	  Georgia	  (Papava,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  substantial	  interventions	  on	  the	  economy	  through	  non-­‐liberal	  measures	  characterized	  Saakashvili’s	  economic	  agenda.	   In	   addiction,	   doing	   business	   in	   Georgia	  was	   affected	   by	   the	   arbitrarily	  decision	  of	  the	  UNM,	  which	  was	  determinant	  in:	  keeping	  alive	  informal	  practices	  and	  networks	  (Aliyev,	  2014),	  providing	  access	  to	  certain	  markets	  (Timm,	  2012:	  176),	   and	   carrying	   out	   property	   expropriation	   (Christiansen,	   2006).	   With	   a	  judiciary	   power	   not	   fully	   independent	   (Ditrych,	   2013),	   the	   absence	   of	   social	  rights	  for	  employees	  and	  violation	  of	  property	  right	  Georgia	  was	  an	  example	  of	  authoritarian	   liberalist	   country	   (Jobelius,	   2012:	   88).	   To	   sum	   up,	   business	   in	  Georgia	  was	  possible	  as	  long	  as	  entrepreneurs	  or	  investors	  were	  not	  financing	  or	  helping	  opposition’s	  movements.	  	  	  Despite	   the	   government	   attempted	   to	   harshly	   control	   all	   the	   opposition	  activities,	   one	   member	   of	   the	   economic	   elite,	   Bidzina	   Ivanishvili,	   started	   to	  challenge	  Saakashvili’s	  administration.	  Ivanishvili	   is	  one	  of	  the	  richest	  Georgian	  oligarchs,	  which	  amassed	  a	  vast	  fortune	  during	  the	  privatization	  era	  in	  early	  90s	  in	   Russia	   and	   since	   October	   2011	   he	   started	   campaigning	   against	   Saakashvili	  through	   its	   new	   political	   party,	   called	   “Georgian	   Dream”	   (GD),	   for	   the	  parliamentary	  election	   in	  2012.	   In	  one	  of	  his	   first	  written	  statement	   Ivanshivili	  openly	   condemned	   Saakashvili’s	   management,	   saying	   that	   “Actually	   no	   free	  business	  exists	  in	  Georgia	  because	  of	  the	  unprecedented	  pressure	  exerted	  on	  the	  Georgian	  business	  through	  use	  of	  tax	  [service],	  prosecutor’s	  office	  and	  judiciary	  –	  it	   [the	  market]	   is	   totally	   controlled	   by	   the	   Saakashvili	   group	  with	   its	   financial	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revenues;	  aggressive	  dispersals	  of	  protest	  rallies,	  cruel	  beating	  of	  protesters	  and	  their	   persecution	   has	   become	   a	   norm”	   (Civil	   Georgia,	   October	   7,	   2011).	   At	   the	  outset	  the	  Georgian	  Dream	  was	  not	  a	  unified	  political	  actor	  with	  policy	  positions	  really	   defined,	   instead	   it	   was	   more	   a	   network	   of	   people	   that	   started	   to	   be	  disgusted	  by	  Saakashvili’s	  presidency	  (Fairbanks,	  Gugushvili,	  2013).	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   facts,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   the	   economy	   indicators	   in	   2009	   showed	   a	   negative	  outlook	  (Georgia	  GDP	  Annual	  Growth	  Rate	  -­‐4%13)	  and	  illegal	  economic	  practices	  as	   long	   as	   lively	   corruption	   started	   to	   nullify	   government’s	   attempts	   to	  reinvigorate	  the	  economy:	  foreign	  investors	  stopped	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  the	   task	   to	   fight	   poverty	   through	   economic	   development	   failed	   (Fairbanks,	  Gugushvili,	  2013).	  	  Saakashvili’s	  government	  started	  to	  be	  attacked	  for	  its	  policies	  both	  concerning	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  civil	  and	  political	  liberties.	  The	  government	  re-­‐acted	  trying	  to	  discredit	  first	  of	  all	  Ivanishvili	  (by	  spying	  into	  his	  computer	  and	  private	  life	  in	  order	   to	   gather	   material	   for	   a	   kompromat,	   and	   by	   depriving	   him	   from	   his	  Georgian	   citizenship);	   subsequently	   the	   government	   issued	   a	   law	   limiting	  expenditure	  for	  campaigning	  contribution,	  it	  inflicted	  more	  than	  $	  125	  million	  in	  fine	   to	   GD	   for	   irregularities	   in	   financing	   activities.	   This	   led	   to	   Saakashvili	  declaring	   in	   August	   2012	   that	   GD	   was	   not	   in	   line	   with	   the	   legal	   standard	  concerning	  the	  election’s	  rule	  and	  thus	  was	  barred	  from	  running	  for	  the	  election.	  However,	   soon	   after	   Saakashvili	   retracted.	   Fearing	   possible	   negative	  consequences	   both	   from	   his	   western	   supporters	   and	   from	   Georgian	   people,	  Saakashvili	   did	   not	   dare	   to	   fully	   “eliminate”	   Ivanshivili	   and	   his	   party	   from	   the	  political	   arena	   (Fairbanks	   and	   Gugushvili,	   2013).	   Saakashvili	   was	   affected	   and	  thus	   limited,	  when	  he	  had	  to	  deal	  with	   Ivanshivili,	  by	   the	  high	   level	  of	  western	  leverage	   and	   by	   his	   rhetoric	   on	   the	   democratic	   development	   of	   the	   country	  (Fairbanks	  and	  Gugushvili,	  2013;	  Levitsky	  and	  Way,	  2010).	  	  	  This	   episode	   shed	   lights	   on	   how	   difficult	   is	   ruling	   and	   holding	   the	   power	   in	   a	  hybrid	   regimes,	   where	   fine	   and	   well	   tuned	   balances	   of	   power	   are	   extremely	  important	   in	   keeping	   the	   different	   elements	   of	   the	   pyramids	   of	   power	   bound	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Source:	  CIA	  World	  Factbook	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together.	  According	  to	  Fairbanks	  “Saakashvili	  and	  his	  lieutenants	  found	  that	  they	  had	   imprisoned	   themselves	   in	   a	   box	   of	   democratic	   rules”	   (Fairbanks	   and	  Gugushvili,	   2013:121)	   and	   they	   could	   not	   avoid	   to	   ultimately	   obey	   to	   them.	  Otherwise	  they	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  their	  “democratic”	  outlook	  neither	  toward	   the	  West,	   nor	   toward	   the	   people.	   As	   Schedler	   points	   out,	   institutional	  manipulation	   might	   serve	   to	   preserve	   power,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   may	  provoke	   negative	   consequences	   for	   the	   incumbents;	   therefore	   it	   is	   a	  matter	   of	  finding	  the	  right	  “manipulative	  equilibria”	  (Schedler,	  2013:	  269)	  in	  order	  to	  cope	  with	  current	  challenges	  and	  avoid	  future	  rebounds.	  	  Saakashvili	   did	   not	   find	   the	   right	   equilibria	   and	   at	   the	   2012	   parliamentary	  election	   Georgian	   Dream	   won	   the	   majority	   of	   seats	   (55%),	   whereas	   UNM	  garnered	   just	   40.3%.	   Saakashvili	   soon	   after	   declared	   that	   the	   UNM	   lost	   the	  elections	  and	  he	  recognized	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  party	  led	  by	  Ivanshivili.	  Among	  the	  rank	   of	   the	   UNM	   party	   some	   prominent	   personalities	   started	   to	   abandon	  Saakashvili	   (such	   as	   the	  ministries	   of	  Defence,	   Justice	   and	   Interior).	   Ivanshivili	  was	  elected	  as	  prime	  minister	  of	   the	   country	  and	  he	   stayed	   in	  power	  until	   the	  Presidential	  election	  scheduled	  for	  November	  2013.	  In	  the	  presidential	  elections	  of	   2013,	   the	   first	   after	   the	   constitutional	   reforms	   passed	   by	   Saakashvili,	   the	  candidate	  of	  GD	  –	  Giorgi	  Margvelashvili,	  won	  the	  election	  with	  62%	  of	  the	  vote,	  whereas	   the	  candidate	  of	   the	  UNM	   -­‐	  Davit	  Bakradze	  –	   just	  garnered	  22%.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  for	  Georgia	  to	  experience	  an	  alternation	  of	  power	  without	  coup	  or	   revolution	   since	   its	   independence.	   However,	   it	   is	   still	   too	   early	   to	   judge	  whether	  this	  alternation	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  real	  path	  toward	  democracy	  or	  is	  still	  a	  re-­‐structuration	   of	   hybridity.	   According	   to	   Fairbanks	   there	   are	   persisting	  ambiguities	   in	   the	   way	   GD	   is	   managing	   the	   country	   and	   he	   stresses	   “the	  importance	  that	  the	  crucial	  decisions	  about	  Georgia’s	  direction	  are	  not	  going	  to	  be	  made	   in	   churches,	   business	   offices,	   or	   student	   or	   NGO	  meeting	   rooms,	   but	  rather	   in	   the	   halls	   of	   formal	   politics.”	   (Fairbanks,	   2014:165)	   because	  Georgian	  people	  seemed	  too	  scared	  to	  take	  a	  clear	  road.	  This	  corroborate	  the	  formulation	  of	   this	   article,	  where	   it	   is	   emphasised	   the	   role	  of	   the	  elites	   in	  determining	  and	  consolidating	  the	  regime	  of	  the	  country.	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Continuity	  and	  change	  	  There	   are	  many	  differences	  between	  Shevardnadze	   style	   and	  Saakashvili	   style,	  however	  both	  ruled	  a	  country	  for	  most	  a	  decade	  and	  did	  not	  transform	  it	  into	  a	  fully	  democracy	  or	  a	  hegemonic	  autocracy.	  Both	  suffered	  from	  institutional	  and	  informational	  uncertainties	  and	  they	  both	  tried	  to	  cope	  with	  those	  shortcomings	  through	  institutional	  manipulation.	  Both	  the	  presidencies	  could	  rely	  on	  a	  dense	  mechanism	  of	  anchors,	  which	  were	  able	   to	  keep	  stakeholders,	   civil	   society	  and	  ethnic	  bound	  together.	  	  Therefore,	   Georgia,	   despite	   it	   never	   become	   a	   fully	   autocracy	   or	   a	   fully	  democracy	   it	   experienced	   a	   long	   period	   of	   consolidation:	   it	   consolidated	   as	  hybrid	  regime.	  This	  process	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  double	  step	  of	  consolidation	  because	  as	  far	  as	  elites	  are	  concerned,	  they	  played	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  assuring	  the	  durability	  of	  the	  system.	  Thus,	  alternations	  in	  power,	  despite	  rare,	  can	  occur	  and	  provoke	  a	  deep	  re-­‐structuration	  and	  re-­‐balancing	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  vested	  interests.	   The	   anchors	   must	   be	   re-­‐built	   and	   re-­‐organized.	   There	   is	   continuity	  beneath	  all	  the	  arrays:	  this	  is	  proved	  by	  the	  constancy	  in	  avoiding	  the	  full	  enter	  into	  force	  of	  a	  real	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  by	  the	  continuity	  to	  underpin	  the	  system	  with	  informal	   practices	   such	   as	   neo-­‐patrimonialistic	   networks	   and	   institutional	  manipulation.	  The	  substantial	  outcome	  is	  that	  the	  elites	  involved	  in	  this	  process	  become	   over	   time	   aware	   about	   those	   practices	   and	   contributed	   to	   the	  consolidation	   of	   the	   hybridity	   of	   the	   system.	   Therefore,	   despite	   the	   different	  president’s	  style,	  we	   found	  similarities	   in	   the	  way	   the	   two	  presidents	  managed	  the	   various	   elites	   and	   stakeholders	   even	   if	   the	   Rose	   Revolution	   determined	   a	  massive	  spoil	  system	  within	  the	  state	  branches.	  	  	  Concerning	  the	  linchpins	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  this	  analysis,	  warlords	  and	  integrity	  of	   the	   territory,	   fragmentation	  of	   the	  political	  actors,	   and	  relationship	  between	  political	  and	  economic	  elites,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  verify	  that:	  warlords	  and	  territorial	   integrity	   were	   fundamental	   to	   the	   consolidation	   of	   power	   in	   both	  cases;	  Shevardnadze	   included	   local	  warlords	   in	  his	  system	  of	  anchors,	  whereas	  Saakashvili	   openly	   contrasted	   them	   causing	   eventually	   an	   intra-­‐states	   conflict;	  after	   that	   the	   warlords	   have	   been	   replaced	   as	   interlocutor	   by	   Russian	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counterparts.	   Yet,	   the	   “Cyprusization”	   of	   the	   situation	   lies	   on	   further	   possible	  developments	  of	  Georgia	  in	  the	  Western	  sphere	  of	  influence	  and	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  escape	  from	  Russia’s	  shadow.	  For	  what	  concern	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  political	  actors	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   observe	   how	   despite	   the	   highly-­‐fragmented	   political	  landscape,	   both	   Shevardnadze	   and	   Saakashvili	   succeed	   in	   consolidating	   their	  power	  vis	  à	  vis	  other	  political	  actors	  through	  a	  impressive	  system	  of	  co-­‐optation,	  corruption	   and	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   mechanisms	   of	   domination.	   The	   ability	   of	   the	  two	  presidents	  in	  anchoring	  the	  other	  societal	  and	  political	  actors	  assured	  them	  to	   dispose	   of	   high-­‐level	   of	   loyalties	   and	   to	   develop	   informal	   practices	   and	  mechanism	   of	   institutional	   manipulation	   that	   are	   fundamental	   to	   consolidate	  power	  in	  a	  context	  of	  democratic	  rule	  of	  law.	  However,	  they	  both	  missed	  to	  fully	  manage	  a	  key	  element	  in	  the	  country:	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  business	  elites.	  This	  might	  be	   seen	  as	  one	  of	   the	  most	   challenging	   task	   to	  be	  manipulated	  and	   thus	  controlled.	   One	   reason	   is	   that,	   as	   Hale	   points	   out,	   in	   hybrid	   regimes	   there	   is	  “lower	   level	   of	   business	   confidence	   because	   of	   authorities	   systemically	  politicized	  business	  (Hale,	  2011:40).	  Therefore	  for	  what	  concerns	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  anchoring	  mechanism	  of	  the	  Shevardnadze	  and	  Saakashvili	  presidencies	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conclude	  that	  they	  were	  lacking	  a	  strong	  grip	  on	  the	  economic	  sector.	  This	   analysis	   is	   in	   line	   with	   what	   Scott	   Radnitz	   that	   recognized	   economic	  pluralism	  as	  key	  elements	  that	  characterizes	  and	  differentiates	  post-­‐communist	  countries	  and	  theirs	  political	  developments.	  According	  to	  Radnitz	  when	  business	  elites	  believe	  “that	  a	  change	  in	  the	  status	  quo	  benefit	  them,	  they	  [have]	  form[ed]	  tactical	  alliances	  with	  opposition	  activists	  and	  parties	   to	  help	  unseat	   the	  ruling	  elite”	   (Radnitz,	  2010:127),	  without	  necessarily	   looking	   for	   a	   real	   change	   in	   the	  form	  of	  government.	  In	  Georgia,	  it	  happened	  in	  both	  cases	  that	  economic	  actors	  were	   not	   satisfied	   with	   the	   economy	   and	   they	   put	   the	   presidencies	   under	  pressure,	   this	   in	   turn	  provoked	  the	  crisis	  of	   the	  elite	   in	  power.	  Despite	  a	  “Rose	  Revolution”	   we	   did	   not	   assist	   a	   democratic	   breakthrough,	   but	   simply	   an	  alternation	   of	   power	   in	   line	   with	   the	   normal	   dynamics	   of	   patronal	  presidentialism	   observed	   by	   Hale.	   In	   this	   sense,	   we	   might	   observe	   that	   the	  anchors	   related	   to	   the	  government-­‐private	   relations	   in	  hybrid	   regimes,	   are	   the	  most	   fragile	   as	   these	   connections	   are	   extremely	   volatile	   and	   unpredictable.	  Similar	   dynamics	   characterized	   the	   rise	   and	   the	   fall	   of	   ruling	   elites	   also	   in	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Ukraine,	  Kyrgyzstan.	  Therefore,	   I	  am	  convinced	  that	   further	  explorations	  of	  the	  relationships	   among	   incumbents	   and	   business	   elites	   in	   hybrid	   regimes	   are	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  understanding	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  regime	  and	  how	  they	  consolidate.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	   this	  paper	   I	   investigated	  and	  demonstrated	  how	   incumbents	  consolidate	   the	  hybridity	  of	  their	  regime	  through	  anchoring	  mechanism	  that	  became	  the	  support	  for	  their	  power.	  This	  kind	  of	  regime	  has	  been	  only	  recently	  under	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  academic	   research.	   In	   order	   to	   analyse	   it	   I	   adopted	   a	   theory	   coming	   from	   the	  democratization	   studies	   to	   further	   investigate	   mechanism	   of	   consolidation	   in	  non-­‐democratic	  country,	  and	  I	  took	  Georgia	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  	  	  Prima	   facie	   evidences	   that	   the	   theory	   of	   anchoring	   might	   be	   helpful	   to	   study	  hybrid	   regimes	   came	   from	   elitist	   theory	   and	   recent	   analysis	   of	   the	   “Coloured	  Revolution”.	  Furthermore,	  I	  realised	  that	  thanks	  to	  the	  Theory	  of	  Anchoring	  it	  is	  possible	   to	   analyse	   how	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   incumbents	   are	   able	   to	   maintain	  their	  grip	  on	  the	  society	  and	  on	  the	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  country.	  	  	  The	  most	  important	  results	  are	  twofold.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  that	  this	  paper	  aimed	  to	  further	   explain	  how	  even	   in	   hybrid	   regime	   there	   is	   a	   process	   of	   consolidation,	  and	   thus	   providing	   a	   contribution	   in	   the	   academic	   debate	   regarding	  democratization	  or	  de-­‐democratization	  processes.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  facts,	  this	  paper	  further	   contributes	   to	   the	   conceptualization	   of	   hybridity	   as	   a	   regime	   with	  specific	   characteristics,	   in	   particular	   showing	   that	   despite	   what	   occur	   in	  democracies,	   the	   consolidation	   process	   might	   occur	   every	   time	   there	   is	   an	  alternation	  of	  power.	  The	  validity	  of	  this	  statement	  needs	  further	  investigation	  in	  other	  cases	  of	  alternations	  of	  power	  without	  a	  real	  change	  in	  the	  political	  system.	  Only	  in	  this	  way	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  verify	  whether	  the	  re-­‐consolidation	  period	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  key	  characteristic	  of	  hybrid	  regimes.	  The	  second	  one	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  theoretical	  framework,	  the	  theory	  of	  anchoring,	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  study	  even	  non-­‐democratic	  processes.	  As	   the	  article	  demonstrated	   the	  anchors	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are	  even	  more	   important	  when	   there	   is	  a	   low	   level	  of	   legitimization.	  Lacking	  a	  specific	   theoretical	   framework	   aimed	   at	   analyse	   hybrid	   regime,	   I	   consider	   this	  paper	  an	  attempt	  to	  overcome	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  specific	  theoretical	  framework	  aimed	  at	  study	  hybrid	  regime	  as	  such.	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